![]() ![]() Under the constraints of public reason, a liberal state must refrain from basing law solely on moral or religious doctrines but only such doctrines could furnish reason for restricting marriage to male-female couples or romantic love dyads. Political liberalism requires the disestablishment of monogamous amatonormative marriage. The central argument of Part Two, "Democratizing Marriage," is that liberal reasons for recognizing same-sex marriage also require recognition of groups, polyamorists, polygamists, friends, urban tribes, and adult care networks. ![]() Obligations and the nature of commitment. The discussion raises issues of independent interest for the moral philosopher such as the possibilities and bounds of interpersonal moral ![]() Further, the special value accorded marriage sustains amatonormative discrimination - discrimination against non-amorous or non-exclusive caring relationships such as friendships, adult care networks, polyamorous groups, or urban tribes. ![]() The book contends with the most influential philosophical accounts of the moral value of marriage to argue that marriage has no inherent moral significance. In Part One, "De-Moralizing Marriage," essays on promise and commitment argue that we cannot promise to love and so wedding vows are (mostly) failed promises, and that marriage may be a poor commitment strategy. Yet what moral significance does it have? This book examines its morally salient features - promise, commitment, care, and contract - with surprising results. Even in secular and civil contexts, marriage retains sacramental connotations. ![]()
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